

OCA FILE

RECPT #

55C-1

OCA 86-3485

OCA Record



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Congressional Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20505

Telephone: 482-6136 16 Oct 86

TO: Mr. George Tenet
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate

The attached is being sent to you by STAT

STAT

Chief, Senate Branch

FORM 2-86 **1533** OBSOLETE
PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(40)

Current listing of: T9622:2
 Slug: TAKE 1 OF SEVERAL -- GORBACHEV
 Category: FBIS1

10/14/86 17:50 Page:
 Date: 10/14/86 17:35:29
 Story: 102 (SUB FOR 088, 0

TAKE 1 OF SEVERAL -- GORBACHEV ON REYKJAVIK
 LD142027 MOSCOW TELEVISION SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1800 GMT 14 OCT 86
 (TELEVISION ADDRESS BY CPSU GENERAL SECRETARY MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH
 GORBACHEV ON "VREMYA" PROGRAM, LIVE OR RECORDED -- VIDEO SHOWS
 GORBACHEV SEATED AT DESK FACING CAMERA)

(TEXT) DEAR COMRADES, YOU KNOW THAT THE DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY, ON SUNDAY, MY MEETING IN ICELAND WITH RONALD REAGAN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ENDED. A PRESS CONFERENCE TOOK PLACE ON TELEVISION ON THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING. THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH AND MY REPLIES TO JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED. HAVING RETURNED TO THE HOMELAND, I CONSIDER IT MY DUTY TO TELL HOW THINGS WENT AND HOW WE EVALUATE WHAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN REYKJAVIK.

THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING IN THE CAPITAL OF ICELAND HAVE JUST BEEN DISCUSSED AT A MEETING OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITBURO.

TOMORROW A REPORT WILL BE PUBLISHED ON WHAT KIND OF JUDGMENT HAS BEEN PRONOUNCED BY THE LEADERSHIP OF OUR PARTY ABOUT THIS MAJOR POLITICAL EVENT -- AN EVENT, WHOSE CONSEQUENCES, WE ARE CONVINCED, WILL FOR A LONG TIME HAVE AN EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. BEFORE REYKJAVIK, MUCH WAS SAID AND WRITTEN ABOUT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING. AS USUALLY HAPPENS IN SUCH CASES, THERE WAS A MULTITUDE OF SUPPOSITIONS AND OPINIONS. THIS IS NATURAL. THE EVENT DID NOT PASS WITHOUT SPECULATION, EITHER. NOW THAT THE MEETING HAS ENDED, ITS RESULTS ARE AT THE CENTER OF ATTENTION OF THE WORLD PUBLIC. EVERYBODY IS INTERESTED IN WHAT TOOK PLACE, WHAT IT PRODUCED AND WHAT KIND OF WORLD THERE WILL BE AFTER IT. WE WERE STRIVING AT THE MEETING IN REYKJAVIK TO PUT THE MAIN QUESTIONS OF WORLD POLITICS, THE HALTING OF THE ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, AT THE TOP OF THE AGENDA. THAT, IN FACT, IS HOW IT HAPPENED. WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR OUR URGENCY IN THIS MATTER? ONE FREQUENTLY HEARS FROM ABROAD THAT THE REASON FOR THIS IS OUR INTERNAL PROBLEMS. IN THE CALCULATIONS OF THE WEST, THERE EXISTS A THESIS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS BEAR UP IN ECONOMIC TERMS TO THE ARMS RACE; IT WILL BREAK AND GO CAP IN HAND TO THE WEST; ONE HAS ONLY TO PRESSURE IT SOME MORE AND TO BUILD UP THE POSITION OF STRENGTH. INCIDENTALLY, THIS COULD ALSO BE HEARD IN THE SPEECH MADE, AFTER OUR MEETING, BY THE U.S. PRESIDENT. MORE THAN ONCE I HAVE HAD OCCASION TO SAY THAT SUCH PLANS ARE NOT ONLY BUILT ON SAND, BUT ARE DANGEROUS, SINCE THEY CAN LEAD TO FATAL POLITICAL DECISIONS. WE KNOW OUR PROBLEMS BETTER THAN OTHER PEOPLE DO; WE DO HAVE SOME, WE DISCUSS THEM OPENLY, WE TACKLE THEM, WE HAVE OUR PLANS, OUR APPROACHES IN THIS RESPECT, AND WE HAVE THE COMMON WILL OF THE PARTY AND OF THE PEOPLE. IN GENERAL, I HAVE TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS STRONG TODAY IN ITS COHESION, IN THE POLITICAL

STAT

Current listing of: T9622:2

10/14/86 17:51 Page:

1ENERGY OF THE PEOPLE, IN ITS DYNAMISM; AND I THINK THAT THESE TENDENCIES, AND SO ALSO THE STRENGTH OF OUR SOCIETY, WILL GROW. WE WILL ALWAYS BE ABLE TO STAND UP FOR OURSELVES. THE SOVIET UNION HAS THE MEANS TO ANSWER ANY CHALLENGE, IF THIS SHOULD BE NECESSARY. THIS IS KNOWN BY SOVIET PEOPLE, AND OUGHT TO BE KNOWN THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO PLAY AT POWER GAMES. THIS IS AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS OCCUPATION IN THE NUCLEAR-MISSILE AGE. WE ARE FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE PROTRACTED, FEVERISH STATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HARBORS THE THREAT OF A SUDDEN AND DISASTROUS CRISIS. PRACTICAL STEPS ARE NEEDED IN THE DIRECTION AWAY FROM THE NUCLEAR ABYSS. JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN EFFORTS -- THE EFFORTS OF THE WHOLE WORLD COMMUNITY -- ARE NEEDED IN ORDER RADICALLY TO IMPROVE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. IN THE NAME OF THESE GOALS, ON THE EVE OF THE MEETING, BEFORE WE HAD RECEIVED THE CONSENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN TO A MEETING, WE IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD DONE A LOT OF PREPARATORY WORK.

(MORE)

14 OCT 2115Z WG

Current listing of: T9731:2
Slug:TAKE 2 OF 7 -- 102 (GORBACHEV
Category:FBIS1

10/14/86 19:51 Page:
Date: 10/14/86 19:37:11
Story: 111

///OF PREPARATORY WORK.
LD142049

(TEXT) IN ADDITION TO THE POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE, OTHER DEPARTMENTS, SCIENTIFIC REPRESENTATIVES, MILITARY EXPERTS AND SPECIALISTS FROM VARIOUS BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY TOOK PART IN THIS WORK. THE POSITIONS WE WORKED OUT FOR THE MEETING IN REYKJAVIK WERE THE RESULT OF BROAD AND CONTINUAL DISCUSSION WITH OUR FRIENDS, WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY.

WE SOUGHT TO FILL THE MEETING WITH MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE AND FAR-REACHING PROPOSALS.

NOW ABOUT THE MEETING ITSELF. HOW DID EVENTS DEVELOP THERE? IT IS NECESSARY TO TALK ABOUT THIS NOT JUST IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THE TRUTH, WHICH OUR PARTNERS IN NEGOTIATIONS IN REYKJAVIK ARE ALREADY DISTORTING; BUT CHIEFLY IN ORDER TO SHARE WITH YOU WHAT WE INTEND TO DO NEXT.

THE FIRST MEETING WITH PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN BEGAN ON SATURDAY AT 1030. AFTER THE GREETINGS, INDISPENSABLE ON SUCH OCCASIONS, AND AFTER A SHORT MEETING WITH REPORTERS, WE WERE LEFT ALONE WITH ONE ANOTHER, WITH JUST OUR INTERPRETERS. WE EXCHANGED OPINIONS ON THE GENERAL SITUATION, ON HOW THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES IS SHAPING UP, AND DESIGNATED THE ISSUES WE WERE TO DISCUSS.

THEN I ASKED THE PRESIDENT TO LISTEN TO MY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON THE MAIN ISSUES WHICH WERE THE REASONS WHY WE HAD COME TO THIS MEETING. I HAVE ALREADY SPOKEN ABOUT THESE IN SOME DETAIL AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE. BUT NEVERTHELESS, I SHALL REMIND YOU OF THEM BRIEFLY.

A WHOLE PACKAGE OF MAJOR MEASURES WAS PUT ON THE TABLE WHICH, IF ADOPTED, WOULD INITIATE A NEW EPOCH IN THE LIFE OF MANKIND -- A NUCLEAR-FREE EPOCH. HEREIN IS THE ESSENCE OF A FUNDAMENTAL TURNING POINT IN THE WORLD SITUATION, THE POSSIBILITY OF WHICH WAS EVIDENT AND REAL. WHAT WAS INVOLVED WAS NOT LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS WAS THE CASE IN THE SALT I AND SALT II TREATIES AND OTHER TREATIES, BUT THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD.

Current listing of: T9731:2

10/14/86 19:52 Page:

THE PROPOSAL DEALT WITH STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. I STATED OUR READINESS TO CUT THESE BY 50 PERCENT DURING THE FIRST 5 YEARS. THIS INVOLVED THE HALVING OF STRATEGIC ARMS ON LAND, AT SEA, AND IN THE AIR. IN ORDER TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT EASIER, WE MADE A GREAT CONCESSION: WE REMOVED OUR FORMER DEMANDS TO THE AMERICANS TO INCLUDE AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES ABLE TO REACH OUR TERRITORY, AND THE AMERICAN FORWARD-BASED ARMS, IN THE STRATEGIC EQUATION.

WE WERE ALSO READY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES ABOUT OUR HEAVY MISSILES. WE VIEWED THE PROPOSAL ABOUT STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR COMPLETE ELIMINATION AS PROPOSED BY US ON 15 JANUARY THIS YEAR.

OUR SECOND PROPOSAL DEALT WITH MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. I SUGGESTED TO THE PRESIDENT THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN MISSILES OF THIS CLASS IN EUROPE. AND HERE, TOO, WE MADE A GREAT CONCESSION: WE STATED THAT, IN CONTRAST TO OUR FORMER POSITION, THE NUCLEAR MISSILES WEAPONS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE NEED NOT BE COUNTED IN.

WE TOOK AS OUR STARTING POINT THE NEED TO CLEAR THE WAY TO DETENTE IN EUROPE, TO FREE THE EUROPEAN PEOPLES FROM THE FEAR OF A NUCLEAR DISASTER, AND THEN TO PROGRESS TO THE ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR ARMS. YOU WILL AGREE THAT THIS IS ALSO A BOLD STEP ON OUR PART. KNOWING IN ADVANCE THE OBJECTIONS THERE MIGHT BE, WE STATED THAT WE WERE WILLING TO FREEZE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH A RANGE OF LESS THAN 1,000 KM, AND TO START IMMEDIATELY ON TALKS ABOUT THEIR FURTHER FATE. AS FOR MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE ASIAN PART OF OUR COUNTRY, A QUESTION WHICH HAS ALWAYS BEEN PRESENT IN THE GLOBAL OPTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, WE PROPOSED STARTING TALKS ON THAT QUESTION IMMEDIATELY.

AS YOU CAN SEE, HERE, TOO, OUR PROPOSALS WERE OF A MAJOR AND SERIOUS NATURE, PROVIDING THE OPPORTUNITY OF FUNDAMENTALLY RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM TOO.

THE THIRD ISSUE, WHICH I PUT BEFORE THE PRESIDENT IN THE VERY FIRST CONVERSATION, AND WHICH WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS -- THAT IS THE EXISTING TREATY ON ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE AND ITS BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING. OUR APPROACH IS THIS: ONCE WE ENTER A COMPLETELY NEW SITUATION, WHEN A CONSIDERABLE REDUCATION OF NUCLEAR

Current listing of: T9731:2 10/14/86 19:52 Page:
 1WEAPONS AND THEIR ELIMINATION OVER A VISIBLY SHORT PERIOD ARE

STARTING, IT IS NECESSARY TO SAFEGUARD ONESELF AGAINST ALL SURPRISES. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT WEAPONS THAT UP TO NOW CONSTITUTE THE CORE OF THE DEFENSE OF OUR COUNTRY; THEREFORE, EVERYTHING THAT COULD UNDERMINE EQUALITY IN THE COURSE OF DISARMAMENT HAS TO BE EXCLUDED; ANY POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPING (SOZDAT) WEAPONS OF A NEW TYPE SECURING MILITARY SUPERIORITY MUST BE EXCLUDED. WE BELIEVE THIS POSITION TO BE PERFECTLY NATURAL AND LOGICAL, AND SO WE FIRMLY STATED THE NEED FOR STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE ABM TREATY OF 1972 THAT HAS NO FIXED PERIOD, AND, MOREOVER, IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE CONDITIONS OF THAT TREATY, WE PROPOSED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS BE UNDERTAKEN ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION NOT TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY, AT LEAST FOR 10 YEARS, AND OVER THAT PERIOD TO PUT AN END TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HAS CREATED FOR ITSELF ON THIS ISSUE, WHEN THE PRESIDENT HAS PERSONALLY LINKED HIMSELF WITH SPACE WEAPONS, WITH THE SO-CALLED SDI, WE DID NOT REQUEST THE CESSATION OF WORK IN THIS SPHERE, BUT WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY WOULD BE FULLY OBSERVED, THAT IS, THAT RESEARCH AND TESTING IN THIS FIELD WOULD NOT GO OUTSIDE THE CONFINES OF THE LABORATORY. THIS IS AN IDENTICAL LIMITATION, BOTH FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR THE SOVIET UNION. AS HE LISTENED TO US, THE PRESIDENT MADE REMARKS, AND ASKED FOR SOME THINGS TO BE EXPLAINED IN MORE DETAIL; IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION, WE RAISED THE QUESTION OF MONITORING, (KONTROL) IN RESOLUTE AND DEFINITE TERMS. HAVING TIED IT IN WITH THE PRE: (CORRECTS HIMSELF -- FBIS) THE POST-NUCLEAR SITUATION. AND THIS SITUATION REQUIRES PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT IF BOTH COUNTRIES EMBARK ON THE PATH OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, THEN THE SOVIET UNION WILL TIGHTEN UP ITS POSITION ON MONITORING. IT MUST BE REAL, ALL-ENCOMPASSING, CONVINCING, IT MUST INSPIRE TOTAL CONFIDENCE IN THE RELIABILITY OF THE OBSERVANCE OF THE AGREEMENT, AND CONTAIN THE RIGHT TO INSPECT ON-SITE.

I MUST TELL YOU, COMRADES, THAT THE FIRST REACTION FROM THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT ENTIRELY NEGATIVE. HE EVEN SAID: WHAT YOU HAVE SET FORTH JUST NOW REASSURES US. HOWEVER, THE FACT DID NOT ESCAPE US THAT OUR INTERLOCUTORS -- BOTH COMRADE SHEVARDNADZE AND MR SHULTZ HAD BY NOW JOINED IN THE CONVERSATION ON THESE ISSUES -- THAT OUR INTERLOCUTORS WERE IN SOME CONFUSION. AT THE SAME TIME, IN THEIR UNCOORDINATED REMARKS THERE IMMEDIATELY APPEARED DOUBTS AND OBJECTIONS. THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE, BEGAN IMPROMPTU, AS THEY SAY, TO TALK ABOUT DIVERGENCES AND DISAGREEMENTS.

IN THESE WORDS OF THEIRS, WE CLEARLY CAUGHT FAMILIAR OLD SOUNDS WHICH WE HAVE BEEN HEARING FOR MANY MONTHS AT THE GENEVA TALKS.

(MORE)
 14 OCT 2320Z WG

Current listing of: T9731:2

10/14/86 19:52 Page:

Current listing of: T9739:2
Slug:TAKE 3 OF 7 -- 102 (GORBACHEV
Category:FBIS1

10/14/86 20:00 Page:
Date: 10/14/86 19:48:05
Story: 112

///THE GENEVA TALKS.

LD142057

(TEXT) WE WERE REMINDED ABOUT ALL KINDS OF SUB-LEVELS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ABOUT AN INTERIM OPTION FOR MISSILES IN EUROPE, THAT WE SHOULD JOIN IN THE SDI -- WE, THE SOVIET UNION -- AND REPLACE THE EXISTING ABM TREATY WITH SOME NEW TREATY. AND WE HEARD MUCH MORE IN THIS SPIRIT FROM THEIR SIDE. I EXPRESSED SURPRISE: HOW CAN IT BE? WE ARE PROPOSING TO ACCEPT THE AMERICAN ZERO IN EUROPE AND SIT DOWN AT A NEGOTIATING TABLE OVER THE MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN ASIA, WHILE YOU, MR PRESIDENT, ARE RETREATING FROM YOUR PREVIOUS POSITION. I DON'T UNDERSTAND IT. IN RESPECT OF THE ABM, WE ARE PROPOSING TO PRESERVE AND CONSOLIDATE THAT FUNDAMENTAL, IMPORTANT AGREEMENT, WHILE YOU WANT TO GIVE IT UP AND ARE EVEN PROPOSING TO REPLACE IT WITH SOME NEW TREATY. AND THEREBY, AFTER BREAKING WITH SALT II, ALSO TO WRECK THIS MECHANISM WHICH PRESERVES STRATEGIC STABILITY. THAT I TOO CANNOT UNDERSTAND.

WE HAVE ALSO FIGURED OUT THE SDI PLANS, I SAID. IF THE UNITED STATES CREATES A THREE-LAYER ABM SYSTEM IN SPACE, WE SHALL RESPOND TO THAT. BUT WE ARE CONCERNED BY SOMETHING ELSE: SDI WOULD MEAN WEAPON TRANSFER TO A NEW ENVIRONMENT WHICH WOULD DESTABILIZE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND MAKE IT EVEN WORSE THAN TODAY. IF SUCH IS THE U.S. OBJECTIVE, THEN THAT IS WHAT YOU SHOULD SAY. BUT IF YOU TRULY WANT TO HAVE SOUND SECURITY FOR YOUR OWN PEOPLE AND FOR THE WHOLE WORLD, THEN THE AMERICAN POSITION IS ABSOLUTELY GROUNDLESS.

I TOLD THE PRESIDENT STRAIGHT: WE HAVE ADVANCED NEW MAJOR PROPOSALS WHILE FROM YOU WE ARE NOW HEARING WHAT EVERYONE HAS TRULY HAD ENOUGH OF, AND WHAT CANNOT LEAD ANYWHERE. I ASK YOU, MR PRESIDENT, TO EXAMINE OUR PROPOSALS ONCE AGAIN CAREFULLY AND TO ANSWER ITEM BY ITEM. AND I PRESENTED TO HIM, TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH, PREPARED EARLIER IN MOSCOW, A DRAFT OF POSSIBLE DIRECTIVES WHICH, SHOULD AGREEMENT BE REACHED IN PRINCIPLE, WE COULD GIVE TO OUR FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTERS AND OTHER DEPARTMENTS FOR THE PREPARATION OF THREE DRAFT AGREEMENTS. THEN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO SIGN THEM DURING MY VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES.

WE MET AGAIN IN THE AFTERNOON. THE PRESIDENT READ OUT THE POSITION THAT HAD BEEN DRAWN UP DURING THE BREAK. IT BECAME CLEAR AFTER THE VERY FIRST SENTENCE THAT WE WERE AGAIN BEING OFFERED -- AS I PUT IT AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE -- A LOAD OF MOTHBALLED JUNK WHICH IS ALREADY STIFLING THE GENEVA TALKS. ALL KINDS OF INTERIM VARIANTS, NUMBERS, LEVELS, SUBLEVELS, AND SO ON. NOT ONE NEW THOUGHT. NOT ONE FRESH APPROACH, NOT ONE IDEA THAT MIGHT HAVE

Current listing of: T9739:2 10/14/86 20:00 Page:
 2 INCLUDED EVEN A HINT AT SOME KIND OF SOLUTION, AT SOME KIND OF
 FORWARD MOVEMENT.

IT BECAME CLEAR, COMRADES, THAT THE AMERICANS CAME TO REYKJAVIK COMPLETELY EMPTYHANDED. THE IMPRESSION WAS CREATED THAT THEY HAD COME THERE ONLY TO GATHER FRUIT INTO THEIR BASKET WITH EMPTY HANDS.

THE SITUATION WAS DRAMATIC. THE U.S. PRESIDENT WAS NOT PREPARED TO DECIDE THE QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE IN A MAJOR WAY, TO COME PART WAY TO MEET US, SO AS REALLY TO GIVE AN IMPULSE TO TALKS THAT WOULD PRODUCE RESULTS AND GIVE RISE TO HOPE. AND IT WAS PRECISELY FOR THIS THAT I CALLED ON THE PRESIDENT IN MY LETTER IN WHICH I PUT FORWARD THE IDEA OF HOLDING THE URGENT AND IMMEDIATE MEETING SO AS TO GIVE A POWERFUL IMPULSE AT THE LEVEL OF THE TOP LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, AN IMPULSE TO THE TALKS ON DISARMAMENT, NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.

CONVINCED THAT OUR PROPOSALS HAD BEEN CAREFULLY THOUGHT OUT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF OUR PARTNER, WE DECIDED NOT TO GIVE UP ON OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A BREAKTHROUGH AT THE MEETING. AFTER MANY CLARIFYING QUESTIONS, A RAY OF HOPE APPEARED ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS. LATCHING ONTO THIS, WE TOOK YET ANOTHER GREAT STEP IN THE SEARCH FOR A COMPROMISE.

I SAID TO THE PRESIDENT: BOTH YOU AND WE HAVE AN ACKNOWLEDGED TRIAD OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS: THESE ARE LAND-BASED MISSILES, STRATEGIC SUBMARINES, AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS. SO LET US REDUCE EACH PART OF THIS TRIAD BY 50 PERCENT. AND THEN THIS DOES AWAY WITH THE NEED FOR ALL SORTS OF LEVELS, SUB-LEVELS AND ALL SORTS OF CALCULATIONS. AFTER LENGTHY DEBATES, WE MANAGED TO REACH MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THIS ISSUE.

THEN A DISCUSSION DEVELOPED ON THE PROBLEM OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. THE AMERICANS STUBBORNLY DEFENDED THE SO-CALLED INTERIM OPTION, WHICH ENVISAGED RETAINING A PART OF THEIR MISSILES REMAINING IN EUROPE, INCLUDING PERSHING II MISSILES, AND, OF COURSE, RETAINING OUR CORRESPONDING MISSILES, THE SS-20, LIKEWISE. WE CAME OUT CATEGORICALLY AGAINST THIS. I HAVE ALREADY EXPLAINED WHY. EUROPE DESERVES TO BE RID OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TO CEASE BEING A NUCLEAR HOSTAGE. THE PRESIDENT, FOR HIS PART, HAD DIFFICULTY FIGHTING AGAINST HIS OWN ZERO OPTION, WHICH HE HAD BEEN PUSHING FOR SUCH A LONG TIME. AND NEVERTHELESS, WE SENSED THE AMERICANS' INTENTION TO FRUSTRATE ANY AGREEMENT, UNDER THE GUISE OF SPECIAL CONCERN FOR THEIR ALLIES IN ASIA. A LOT WAS SAID ABOUT THAT BY THE AMERICAN SIDE THAT WAS UNFOUNDED. THERE IS SIMPLY NO POINT IN REPEATING ALL THIS TODAY.

Current listing of: T9739:2

10/14/86 20:00 Page:

AND THINGS STARTED GOING WELL ONLY WHEN WE MADE YET ANOTHER STEP TO MEET THEM, ON THIS ISSUE AS WELL. WE AGREED TO THE FORMULA: ZERO MISSILES IN EUROPE, AND 100 WARHEADS EACH ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE EAST OF OUR COUNTRY, AND CORRESPONDINGLY FOR THE AMERICANS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES RESPECTIVELY.

THE MAIN THING IS THAT WE MANAGED TO COME TO AGREEMENT ON RIDDING THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT OF NUCLEAR MISSILES. AGREEMENT WAS THUS REACHED, TOO, ON THE ISSUE OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. AN IMPORTANT BREAKTHROUGH WAS MADE IN THIS ASPECT OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, TOO.

(MORE)

14 OCT 2321Z WG

Current listing of: T9744:2
Slug:TAKE 4 OF 7 -- 102 (GORBACHEV
Category:FBIS1

10/14/86 20:11 Page:
Date: 10/14/86 19:59:16
Story: 113

///NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, TOO.
LD142126

(TEXT) THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION DID NOT SUCCEED IN EVADING OUR PERSISTENT STRIVING TO GET POSITIVE RESULTS. BUT THE QUESTIONS OF ABM AND A BAN ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS STILL REMAINED.

PRIOR TO OUR MEETING THE NEXT DAY, ON SUNDAY, FOR OUR THIRD CONVERSATION, WHICH ACCORDING TO THE SCHEDULE SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE FINAL ONE, TWO GROUPS OF EXPERTS, FROM OUR SIDE AND THE AMERICAN SIDE, WORKED THROUGH THE NIGHT. THEY THOROUGHLY ANALYZED WHAT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT OUR TWO PRECEDING MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND ACCORDINGLY REPORTED THE RESULTS OF THEIR NIGHTTIME DEBATES TO MYSELF AND TO THE PRESIDENT. THE RESULT WAS AS FOLLOWS: A POSSIBILITY EMERGED FOR GETTING DOWN TO ELABORATING AGREEMENTS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. IN THAT SITUATION, THE ABM TREATY ACQUIRED A KEY SIGNIFICANCE. ITS ROLE WAS BECOMING EVEN MORE IMPORTANT. CAN WE POSSIBLY WRECK, SAID I, WHAT UNTIL NOW HAS BEEN SOMEHOW MAKING IT POSSIBLE TO RESTRAIN THE ARMS RACE TO SOME DEGREE. AND IF NOW WE ARE GOING TO REDUCE STRATEGIC AND MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE CONFIDENT THAT NOBODY DURING THAT TIME WILL CREATE NEW WEAPONS THAT WOULD UNDERMINE THE STABILITY AND PARITY. THAT IS WHY TO ME IT SEEMS COMPLETELY LOGICAL TO DEFINE A TIME LIMIT. THE AMERICANS WERE SPEAKING ABOUT 7 YEARS; WE PROPOSED 10 YEARS. THE VERY SAME 10 YEARS DURING WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE TO BE DESTROYED. WE PROPOSED 10 YEARS DURING WHICH NEITHER THE SOVIET NOR THE AMERICAN SIDE WOULD MAKE USE OF THE RIGHT, AND THEY HAVE SUCH RIGHT, TO ABANDON THE ABM TREATY. AND RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTS WOULD BE CONDUCTED IN THE LABORATORY ONLY. AND SO I THINK YOU UNDERSTAND WHY 10 YEARS. THIS IS NOT COINCIDENTAL, AS I SAID BEFORE. THE LOGIC HERE IS SIMPLE AND PURE. IN THE FIRST 5 YEARS THE FIRST 50 PERCENT OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS ARE CUT, AND IN THE SECOND 5 YEARS, THE SECOND HALF. THAT MAKES 10 YEARS.

AND IN THIS SAME CONNECTION, I PROPOSED ENTRUSTING OUR RESPONSIBLE REPRESENTATIVES WITH BEGINNING FULL-SCALE TALKS ON BANNING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN ORDER, AS A RESULT, TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT ON A COMPLETE AND FINAL BAN ON THEM. AND DURING THE PREPARATION FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT -- HERE, TOO, WE SHOWED FLEXIBILITY AND TOOK A CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION -- IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE AT THE SAME TIME TO SOLVE INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. IN RESPONSE, WE AGAIN HEARD AN ARGUMENT FROM THE PRESIDENT, WHICH IS VERY FAMILIAR FROM GENEVA AND FROM HIS PUBLIC SPEECHES, ABOUT HOW THE SDI IS A DEFENSE SYSTEM, AND, IF WE ELIMINATE NUCLEAR ARMS, HOW WILL WE BE ABLE TO DEFEND OURSELVES FROM ANY MADMAN WHO MIGHT GET NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO HIS HANDS, ABOUT HOW

Current listing of: T9744:2

10/14/86 20:11 Page:

2HE IS READY TO SHARE THE RESULTS OF THE WORK ON SDI WITH US. TO THIS LATTER REMARK, I TOLD THE PRESIDENT: MR PRESIDENT, I AM UNABLE TO TAKE THIS IDEA OF YOURS SERIOUSLY, THE IDEA THAT YOU WILL SHARE WITH US THE RESULTS OF YOUR WORK ON SDI. AT PRESENT, YOU DO NOT EVEN WANT TO SHARE OIL INDUSTRY EQUIPMENT OR DAIRY EQUIPMENT WITH US. SO DO YOU EXPECT US TO BELIEVE A PROMISE TO SHARE SDI DEVELOPMENTS WITH US? THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO A SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION, AND REVOLUTIONS DON'T ACTUALLY HAPPEN THAT OFTEN. I SAID TO PRESIDENT REAGAN: LET US BE REALISTS AND PRAGMATISTS. THAT IS A MORE RELIABLE WAY. WHAT WE ARE DISCUSSING IS TOO SERIOUS.

INCIDENTALLY, YESTERDAY, WHEN HE WAS TRYING TO JUSTIFY HIS POSITION ON THE SDI, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE NEEDED THE PROGRAM FOR AMERICA AND ITS ALLIES TO REMAIN INVULNERABLE TO A SOVIET MISSILE STRIKE.

AS YOU CAN SEE, THE MENTION OF THE MADMEN IS ALREADY MISSING. THE SOVIET THREAT HAS BEEN DRAGGED OUT INTO THE OPEN AGAIN. BUT THAT IS ABSOLUTE TRICKERY. WE HAVE AFTER ALL PROPOSED TO ELIMINATE NOT ONLY STRATEGIC, BUT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR. UNDER STRICT MONITORING, INCIDENTALLY.

WHY IS THE QUESTION OF SAFEGUARDING THE FREEDOM OF AMERICA AND HER FRIENDS FROM THE SOVIET NUCLEAR MISSILES RAISED, THEN? IF THERE WOULD BE NO SUCH MISSILES? IF THERE ARE NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHO NEEDS A DEFENSE AGAINST THEM? IT FOLLOWS THAT THIS WHOLE VENTURE WITH THE STAR WARS IS OF AN EXCLUSIVELY MILITARIST NATURE, AND IT IS AIMED AT GAINING MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIET UNION. LET US GO BACK TO THE TALKS, HOWEVER. ALTHOUGH THE ACCORD ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES HAD BEEN REACHED, IT WAS PREMATURE TO THINK THAT ALL THIS HAD BEEN FINALLY DECIDED IN THE COURSE OF THE FIRST TWO CONVERSATIONS ALONE.

ANOTHER WHOLE DAY LAY AHEAD. ALMOST 8 HOURS OF TENSE AND UNINTERRUPTED DISCUSSIONS, DURING WHICH WE HAD TO RETURN AGAIN AND AGAIN TO THOSE QUESTIONS, WHICH, ONE MIGHT HAVE THOUGHT, HAD ALREADY BEEN AGREED UPON.

IN THESE DISCUSSIONS, THE PRESIDENT ATTEMPTED TO VENTURE INTO IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS, DEMONSTRATING TOTAL IGNORANCE, TO PUT IT MILDLY, AND LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE SOCIALIST WORLD IS AND WHAT GOES ON IN IT. I REJECTED ATTEMPTS TO LINK IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES WITH QUESTIONS OF ENDING THE ARMS RACE. I PERSISTENTLY BROUGHT THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE BACK TO THE MATTER ON WHICH WE WERE MEETING IN REYKJAVIK.

Current listing of: T9744:2

10/14/86 20:11 Page:

I HAD TO REMIND MY COLLOCUTORS TIME AND AGAIN OF ITEM 3 OF OUR PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS, WITHOUT WHICH AGREEMENT ON THE WHOLE WAS IMPOSSIBLE. I MEAN THE NEED FOR STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE ABM TREATY, TO CONSOLIDATE THE REGIME OF THAT CRUCIAL TREATY, AND TO BAN NUCLEAR TESTS.

(MORE)

14 OCT 2327Z WG

Current listing of: T4061:3
Slug:TAKE 5 OF 7 -- 102 (GORBACHEV
Category:FBIS1

10/09/86 10:11 Page: 1
Date: 10/14/86 20:27:48
Story: 002

///BAN NUCLEAR TESTS.

LD142140

(TEXT) AGAIN AND AGAIN WE HAD TO DRAW ATTENTION TO WHAT, ONE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT, WERE QUITE CLEAR THINGS. GIVEN THAT WE HAVE AGREED TO GET DOWN TO DEEP REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARMS, WE MUST CREATE THE SORT OF SITUATION IN WHICH, NOT JUST IN ACTION, BUT EVEN IN THOUGHT, THERE SHOULD BE NO ATTEMPTS TO ROCK THE STRATEGIC STABILITY, AND TO GET AROUND THE ACCORDS. WE MUST -- THERE CAN ONLY BE ONE ANSWER, WHICH IS THAT ONE. THEREFORE, WE MUST HAVE THE CERTAINTY OF THE RETENTION OF THE OPEN-ENDED ABM TREATY.

YOU, MR PRESIDENT, I SAID, MUST AGREE WITH THE FACT THAT, GIVEN THAT WE HAVE GONE FOR NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION, THERE MUST BE TOTAL CERTAINTY IN THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT DO ANYTHING BEHIND THE USSR'S BACK, WHILE THE USSR IS SIMILARLY NOT DOING ANYTHING BEHIND THE UNITED STATE'S BACK WHICH MIGHT PUT YOUR SECURITY UNDER THREAT, WHICH WOULD DEPRECIATE THE AGREEMENT AND CREATE DIFFICULTIES. AND FROM THIS WE HAVE THE KEY TASK OF STRENGTHENING THE ABM CONDITIONS: NOT TO GO OUT INTO SPACE WITH THE DEVELOPMENTS (RAZRABOTKI) OF THIS PROGRAM AND REMAIN WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LABORATORY. THE 10 YEARS OF NOT EXERCISING THE RIGHT TO ABANDON THE ABM TREATY ARE ESSENTIAL TO CREATE CONFIDENCE IN THE FACT THAT, IN RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF ARMS REDUCTION, WE ARE GUARANTEEING THE SECURITY OF EACH SIDE, AND I WOULD EVEN SAY SECURITY THROUGHTOUT THE WORLD AS WELL.

BUT THE AMERICANS WERE CLEARLY INCLINED TOWARD SOMETHING ELSE. WE SAW THAT THE UNITED STATES IN FACT WANTS TO WEAKEN THE ABM TREATY, TO REVISE IT IN ORDER TO DEVELOP (RAZRABOTAT) A LARGE-SCALE SPACE ABM SYSTEM, IN THEIR OWN EGOISTIC INTERESTS. TO AGREE TO THIS WOULD HAVE SIMPLY BEEN IRRESPONSIBLE ON MY PART.

REGARDING NUCLEAR TESTS -- HERE ALSO, IT WAS CLEARER THAN DAYLIGHT WHY THE AMERICAN SIDE DOES NOT WANT TO CONDUCT TALKS IN EARNEST ON THIS SUBJECT. IT WOULD PREFER TO MAKE THEM ENDLESS, TO DEFER A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF BANNING NUCLEAR TESTS FOR DECADES. FOR THE UMPTEENTH TIME WE HAD TO REJECT ATTEMPTS TO USE TALKS AS A SCREEN FOR FREEDOM OF ACTION IN THE SPHERE OF NUCLEAR TESTS. AT THE MEETING I SAID BLUNTLY: I HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE HONESTY OF THE U.S. POSITION. IS THERE INDEED NOTHING IN THIS POSITION WHICH CAN BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE SOVIET UNION? HOW CAN ONE AGREE TO SCAPPING NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS IF THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO IMPROVE THEM? WE WERE STILL LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CHIEF OBSTACLE WAS SDI. IF IT COULD BE REMOVED, IT WOULD BE

Current listing of: T4061:3

10/09/86 10:11 Page: 2

1 POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON A BANNING OF NUCLEAR TESTS, NUCLEAR BLASTS, AS WELL.

AT A CERTAIN STAGE WHEN IT BECAME QUITE CLEAR THAT CONTINUING THE DISCUSSIONS WAS A WASTE OF TIME. I REMINDED THEM: WE HAVE PROPOSED A DEFINITE PACKAGE OF MEASURES AND I REQUEST THAT YOU REGARD IT AS SUCH. IF YOU AND I HAVE WORKED OUT COMMON POSITIONS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF MAJOR REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND HAVE NOT REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE ABM QUESTION AND THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR TESTS, THEN EVERYTHING THAT WE HAVE TRIED TO CREATE HERE COLLAPSES.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE REACTED TO THIS FIRMNESS OF OURS PAINFULLY. BUT I WAS UNABLE TO POSE THE QUESTION IN ANY DIFFERENT WAY. IT WAS A MATTER OF THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY, OF THE SECURITY OF THE WHOLE WORLD, OF ALL PEOPLE AND CONTINENTS.

AN IMPASSE HAD ARISEN. WE PROPOSED MAJOR, REALLY LARGE-SCALE THINGS THAT WERE CLEARLY COMPROMISES. WE MADE CONCESSIONS. HOWEVER. I DID NOT SEE EVEN THE SLIGHTEST DESIRE ON THE AMERICAN SIDE TO REPLY TO US IN THE SAME WAY OR TO MAKE ANY MOVEMENT TO MEET US. WE BEGAN TO THINK OF HOW TO END THIS MEETING, THESE DISCUSSIONS.

NEVERTHELESS, WE CONTINUED OUR ENDEAVORS TO GET OUR PARTNERS TO FOLLOW A CONSTRUCTIVE PATH.

THE CONVERSATION THAT HAD BEEN PLANNED TO BE THE FINAL ONE HAD EXCEEDED THE PERMITTED TIME PERIOD. IN THIS SITUATION, INSTEAD OF GOING AWAY, WE TO MOSCOW AND THEY TO WASHINGTON, WE AGREED ONCE AGAIN TO HAVE A BREAK, LET THE SIDES THINK EVERYTHING OVER, AND AFTER DINNER MEET AGAIN. RETURNING TO THE TOWN MAYOR'S HOUSE AFTER THE BREAK, WE MADE ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO END THE MEETING WITH SUCCESS. WE PRESENTED THE FOLLOWING TEXT AS A BASIS FOR REACHING A POSITIVE RESULT. HERE IS THAT TEXT. I QUOTE:

THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD PLEDGE, FOR A PERIOD OF 10 YEARS, TO REFRAIN FROM USING THEIR GIVEN RIGHT TO ABANDON THE INDEFINITE ABM TREATY, AND FOR THE DURATION OF THIS PERIOD STRICTLY TO ADHERE TO ALL OF ITS PROVISIONS. THE TESTING OF ALL SPACE ELEMENTS OF AN ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE IN SPACE IS FORBIDDEN, EXCEPT RESEARCH AND TESTING CARRIED OUT IN LABORATORIES. DURING THE FIRST 5 YEARS OF THIS 10-YEAR PERIOD, UP TO 1991 INCLUSIVE, THE STRATEGIC

Current listing of: T4061:3

10/09/86 10:11 Page: 3

1 OFFENSIVE WEAPONS OF THE SIDES WILL BE REDUCED BY 50 PERCENT. DURING THE FOLLOWING 5 YEARS OF THIS PERIOD THE REMAINING 50 PERCENT OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS OF THE SIDES WILL BE REDUCED. THUS, BY THE END OF 1996 THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS OF THE USSR AND OF THE UNITED STATES WILL BE TOTALLY ELIMINATED.

COMMENTING ON THIS TEXT, I MADE AN IMPORTANT ADDITION, REFERRING TO A DOCUMENT THAT HAD BEEN HANDED OVER TO THE PRESIDENT AT THE CLOSE OF OUR FIRST CONVERSATION. ITS ESSENCE LAY IN SAYING THAT AT THE EXPIRATION OF TEN YEARS, THEN THERE WOULD ALREADY BE NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WE PROPOSE THE ELABORATION AT SPECIAL TALKS OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DECISION ON HOW TO PROCEED FURTHER. HOWEVER, THIS TIME TOO, OUR ATTEMPTS TO REACH AGREEMENT DID NOT YIELD RESULTS. FOR 4 HOURS WE AGAIN TRIED TO PERSUADE OUR INTERLOCUTORS OF THE WELL-FOUNDED NATURE OF OUR APPROACH, IN WHICH NOTHING THREATENED THEM,

WHICH DID NOT HARM THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES' REAL SECURITY. BUT THE LONGER THIS WENT ON, THE CLEARER IT BECAME THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT GOING TO AGREE TO LIMITING RESEARCH (ISSLEDOVANIYE), DEVELOPMENT (RAZRABOTKA) AND TESTING IN THE SDI PROGRAM TO WITHIN THE LABORATORY. THEY ARE DYING TO HAVE WEAPONS IN SPACE.

I STATED FIRMLY THAT WE WILL NEVER AGREE TO HELPING WITH OUR OWN HANDS TO WRECK THE ABM TREATY. THIS IS FOR US A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, A MATTER OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. AND SO, FINDING OURSELVES LITERALLY ONE, OR TWO OR THREE, STEPS FROM MAKING DECISIONS THAT COULD BE HISTORIC FOR THE WHOLE NUCLEAR SPACE AGE, WE COULD NOT TAKE THIS STEP, OR THESE STEPS. THERE WAS NO TURNING POINT IN WORLD HISTORY, ALTHOUGH -- AND ONCE AGAIN I SAY THIS WITH CONVICTION -- IT WAS POSSIBLE.

BUT OUR CONSCIENCE IS CLEAR. THERE IS NOTHING TO REPROACH US WITH. WE DID EVERYTHING WE COULD. OUR PARTNERS DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT BREADTH OF APPROACH, UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE MOMENT, AND IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS COURAGE, RESPONSIBILITY AND POLITICAL DETERMINATION, WHICH ARE SO NECESSARY IN SOLVING SUCH MOST IMPORTANT, URGENT WORLD PROBLEMS. THEY REMAINED IN THEIR OLD POSITIONS, WHICH TIME HAS ALREADY UNDERMINED AND WHICH DO NOT CORRESPOND TO CONTEMPORARY REALITY. FOREIGNERS THERE IN ICELAND ASKED ME, AND COMRADES HERE ASK ME, WHAT I SEE AS THE REASONS FOR THIS KIND OF CONDUCT BY THE AMERICAN DELEGATION AT THE REYKJAVIK MEETING. THERE ARE MANY REASONS, BOTH SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE ONES, BUT THE MAIN ONE IS THAT THE LEADERSHIP OF THAT GREAT COUNTRY IS TOO DEPENDENT ON THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, ON MONOPOLIST GROUPS WHO HAVE TURNED THE RACE IN NUCLEAR AND OTHER WEAPONS INTO A BUSINESS, MEANS OF MAKING PROFITS, THE AIM OF THEIR EXISTENCE AND THE POINT OF THEIR ACTIVITIES.

Current listing of: T4061:3

10/09/86 10:11 Page: 4

(MORE)

14 OCT 2335Z WG

Current listing of: T4064:3
Slug:TAKE 6 OF 7 -- 102 (GORBACHEV
Category:FBIS1

10/09/86 10:11 Page: 1
Date: 10/14/86 20:38:34
Story: 003

///OF THEIR ACTIVITIES.

LD142158

(TEXT) IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IN THEIR APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION THE AMERICANS ARE MAKING TWO SERIOUS ERRORS. ONE IS TACTICAL -- THEY THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION, SOONER OR LATER, WILL RECONCILE ITSELF TO THE ATTEMPTS TO REVIVE AMERICAN STRATEGIC DICTATE, WILL GO IN FOR A LIMITATION OF ONLY SOVIET, FOR A REDUCTION OF ONLY SOVIET WEAPONS, AND WILL DO THIS BECAUSE, THEY SAY, IT HAS A GREATER INTEREST THAN THE UNITED STATES IN AN ACCORD ON THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT. BUT THAT IS A PROFOUND DELUSION, AND THE QUICKER THE AMERICANS RID THEMSELVES OF IT, THAT IS THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION, AND I AM SAYING THIS FOR PERHAPS THE HUNDREDTH TIME, THE BETTER IT WILL BE, BOTH FOR THEM AND FOR OUR RELATIONS AND FOR THE WHOLE WORLD SITUATION.

THE OTHER ERROR IS A STRATEGIC ONE. THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO EXHAUST THE SOVIET UNION ECONOMICALLY THROUGH A RACE IN THE MOST UP-TO-DATE AND EXPENSIVE SPACE WEAPONS. IT WANTS TO CREATE VARIOUS KINDS OF DIFFICULTIES FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, TO WRECK ITS PLANS, INCLUDING IN THE SOCIAL SPHERE, IN THE SPHERE OF IMPROVING THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF OUR PEOPLE, THUS AROUSING DISSATISFACTION AMONG THE PEOPLE WITH THEIR LEADERSHIP, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COUNTRY, AND BY THE SAME MEANS TO LIMIT THE OPPORTUNITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION IN ITS ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

AND THEY, IN SUCH A SITUATION, WILL ALL BE FORCED TO GO CAP IN HAND TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. FAR-REACHING SCHEMES, BUT BOTH THE STRATEGY AND THE STRATEGIC LINE OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION ARE ALSO BEING BUILT ON DELUSIONS. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT IN WASHINGTON THEY NEITHER WANT TO BURDEN THEMSELVES WITH AN ATTENTIVE ANALYSIS OF CHANGES WHICH ARE TAKING PLACE IN OUR COUNTRY, NOR DO THEY WANT TO DRAW THE CORRESPONDING PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS FOR THEMSELVES AND FOR THEIR COURSE. THEY ARE TRYING TO INDULGE IN WISHFUL THINKING, AND ON THE BASIS OF THIS DELUSION ARE BUILDING A POLICY OF RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. ALL THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A POLICY ARE OF COURSE NOT DIFFICULT TO FORESEE. BUT ONE THING IS ALREADY CLEAR TO US NOW: IT WILL NOT BRING ANYBODY -- IT CANNOT BRING ANYBODY ANYTHING POSITIVE, INCLUDING TO THE UNITED STATES ITSELF. BEFORE SPEAKING BEFORE YOU TODAY, I READ THE STATEMENT BY THE U.S. PRESIDENT ABOUT REYKJAVIK. WHAT DRAWS ATTENTION TO ITSELF IS THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT ASCRIBES ALL OF THE PROPOSALS WHICH WERE DISCUSSED TO HIMSELF. WELL, OBVIOUSLY, THESE PROPOSALS ARE SO ATTRACTIVE FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE PEOPLES OF THE WHOLE WORLD THAT ONE CAN RESORT TO SUCH CUNNING! WE ARE NOT GNAWED BY VANITY. BUT ALL THE SAME IT'S IMPORTANT THAT PEOPLE SHOULD OBTAIN A TRUE PICTURE OF THE COURSE OF AFFAIRS IN

Current listing of: T4064:3

10/09/86 10:11 Page: 2

1 REYKJAVIK, WHAT ELSE? I HAVE ALREADY SAID AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE THAT WORK DONE BOTH BEFORE THE MEETING, AND THERE, IN REYKJAVIK, WILL NOT GO TO WASTE. WE OURSELVES THOUGHT OVER MANY THINGS, IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MEETING, AND REVIEWED MANY THINGS.

WE HAVE NOW CLEARED THE WAY TO BETTER CARRY OUT A FURTHER STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND DISARMAMENT. WE HAVE GOTTEN RID OF THE OBSTRUCTIONS THAT HAD BUILT UP, OF DETAILS AND TRIVIALITIES, OF STEREOTYPES THAT WERE HOLDING UP NEW APPROACHES IN THIS MOST IMPORTANT AREA OF OUR POLICY. WE KNOW WHERE WE ARE. WE SEE OUR CAPABILITIES MORE CLEARLY. THE PREPARATIONS FOR REYKJAVIK HELPED US TO FORMULATE A PLATFORM, A NEW, BOLD PLATFORM WHICH ENLARGES THE CHANCES FOR FISCAL SUCCESS. IT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERESTS OF OUR PEOPLE AND SOCIETY AT THE NEW STAGE OF ITS SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT. AND AT THE SAME TIME THIS PLATFORM IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERESTS OF ALL OTHER COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES, AND THEREFORE DESERVES TRUST.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IT WILL BE MET WITH UNDERSTANDING IN MANY COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, AND IN THE MOST VARIED POLITICAL AND PUBLIC CIRCLES. I THINK THAT VERY MANY PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, INCLUDING PERSONS VESTED WITH POWER, WILL BE ABLE AND BOUND TO DRAW SERIOUS CONCLUSIONS FROM REYKJAVIK. EVERYONE WILL HAVE TO THINK AGAIN AND AGAIN: WHAT IS IT ALL ABOUT? WHY DO SCH OBSTINATE EFFORTS TO CREATE A BREAKTHROUGH, AND MOVE FORWARD TO A NUCLEAR FREE WORLD, TO GENERAL SECURITY, NOT YET YIELD THE NECESSARY RESULTS? I WOULD HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENT TOO, HAS A MORE ACCURATE AND MORE COMPLETE IDEA TODAY OF THE COURSE OF OUR ANALYSIS, THE INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE POSSIBILITIES FOR, AND LIMITS TO MOVEMENT IN THE SOVIET POSITION. MORE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE IN PARTICULAR BECAUSE MR REAGAN GOT THEM AT FIRST HAND. I MEAN THE CLARIFICATIONS ABOUT OUR CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS FOR THE SAKE OF STABILIZING AND IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP NEEDS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TIME. WE ARE REALISTS, AND RECOGNIZE CLEARLY THAT QUESTIONS WHICH OVER MANY YEARS, DECADES EVEN, HAVE NOT FOUND SOLUTIONS CAN HARDLY BE SOLVED IN A SINGLE SITTING. WE HAVE QUITE A BIT OF EXPERIENCE IN CONDUCTING AFFAIRS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. WE KNOW HOW CHANGEABLE THE INTERNAL POLITICAL WEATHER CAN BE, HOW STRONG AND INFLUENTIAL THE ENEMIES OF PEACE ARE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC. NONE OF THIS IS NEW TO US, OR UNEXPECTED. AND IF WE DO NOT GIVE UP, DO NOT SLAM THE DOOR, DO NOT GIVE VENT TO OUR ANNOYANCE -- ALTHOUGH THERE ARE MORE THAN ENOUGH GROUNDS FOR DOING ALL THIS -- IT IS JUST BECAUSE WE ARE SINCERELY CONVINCED OF THE NECESSITY FOR NEW EFFORTS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF NORMAL INTERSTATE RELATIONS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. THERE IS SIMPLY NO OTHER WAY.

Current listing of: T4064:3

10/09/86 10:11 Page: 3

(MORE)

14 OCT 2339Z WG

Current listing of: T9781:2
Slug:TAKE 7 OF 7 -- 102 (GORBACHEV
Category:FBIS1

10/14/86 21:00 Page:
Date: 10/14/86 20:44:41
Story: 004

///NO OTHER WAY.

LD142206

(TEXT) AND ONE MORE THING: AFTER REYKJAVIK THE NOTORIOUS SDI HAS STEPPED EVEN FURTHER INTO EVERYBODY'S VIEW. AS A SYMBOL OF OBSTRUCTION TO THE CAUSE OF RELUCTANCE TO REMOVE THE NUCLEAR THREAT LOOMING OVER HUMANITY. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO INTERPRET IT IN ANY OTHER WAY. THIS IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT LESSONS OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING.

BRIEFLY SUMMING UP THESE HIGHLY CONCENTRATED DAYS, I WOULD SUMMARIZE THEM AS FOLLOWS: THE RECENT MEETING WAS A MAJOR EVENT. A REAPPRAISAL TOOK PLACE. A QUALITATIVELY NEW SITUATION HAS COME ABOUT. NOBODY CAN NOW ACT IN THE SAME WAY AS HE ACTED BEFORE. THE MEETING WAS A USEFUL ONE. IT PREPARED A POSSIBLE STEP FORWARD, TOWARDS A REAL SHIFT TO THE BETTER. IF THE UNITED STATES WILL FINALLY ADOPT REALISTIC POSITIONS AND RENOUNCE ILLUSIONS IN ITS APPRAISALS. THE MEETING PERSUADES US OF THE CORRECTNESS OF THE COURSE WE HAVE CHOSEN, OF THE NEED FOR AND THE CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF THE NEW POLITICAL THINKING IN THE NUCLEAR AGE.

WE ARE FULL OF ENERGY AND RESOLVE. HAVING MADE A START IN RESTRUCTURING, THE COUNTRY HAS ALREADY PROCEEDED SOME DISTANCE. WE HAVE ONLY JUST BEGUN, BUT THERE HAS BEEN AN ADVANCE.

GROWTH IN INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT OVER 9 MONTHS CAME TO 5.2 PERCENT. LABOR PRODUCTIVITY ROSE BY 4.8 PERCENT.

THE NATIONAL INCOME HAS INCREASED 4.3 PERCENT COMPARED WITH LAST YEAR. ALL THESE INDEXES ARE ABOVE THE PLANNED LEVELS FOR THIS YEAR. AND THIS IS THE MOST POWERFUL SUPPORT ON THE PART OF OUR PEOPLE, FOR THESE ARE ALL THE FRUITS OF OUR PEOPLE'S LABOR; THE MOST POWERFUL SUPPORT FOR OUR PARTY'S POLICY IS SUPPORT IN GETTING THINGS DONE. THIS INDICATES THAT THE LABOR OF THE PEOPLE IN THE NEW CONDITIONS PERMITS THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE COUNTRY TO GROW MORE RAPIDLY, AND THEREBY STRENGTHENS ITS DEFENSIVE POTENTIALITIES.

THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ARE UNITED THAT THE POLICY OF SOCIALISM CAN AND MUST BE ONLY A POLICY OF PEACE AND DISARMAMENT. WE WILL NOT DIVERGE FROM THE COURSE OF THE 27TH CPSU CONGRESS.

Current listing of: T9781:2

10/14/86 21:00 Page:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION.

(ENDALL)

14 OCT 2255Z WG